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Introduction
As the second millennium A.D. is coming to an end, the state's attempt to monopolize violence in its own hands is faltering.... Should present trends continue, then the kind of war that is based on the division between government, army, and people seems to be on its way out. The rise of low-intensity conflict may, unless it can be quickly contained, end up destroying the state. Over the long run, the place of the state will be taken by warmaking organizations of a different type.
- for the advent of 4GW, stating "at the heart of this phenomenon, Fourth Generation war is not a military but a political, social, and moral revolution: a crisis of legitimacy of the state." 4 Lind described discontinuity on a historic scale, one profoundly impacting the nature of politics and war.
Lind is not the only theorist to have argued for such profound changes in the nature of war. The Israeli military historian Martin Van Creveld advances the very similar theory of "nontrinitarian" war Lind cites as a major influence on his thinking about the changing nature of war.
5
Section I fully develops this important relationship. Beyond Van Creveld, others have argued the fundamental nature of war changes based on political, cultural, or technological grounds, thus emphasizing discontinuities in war. Mary Kaldor's work carries on the tradition arguing for fundamental change in the nature of war. After the end of the Cold War, "new wars" defined by culture and fracturing states replaced "old wars" between states and armies. 6 Kaldor puts forward three factors explaining the change: first, increased destructiveness brought about by technology "made symmetrical war, war between similarly armed opponents, increasingly difficult"; second, "global communications greatly increased the visibility of war as well as the sense of solidarity with strangers"; third, globalization "transformed" the state and altered its relationship to August 12, 2008 , accessed August 7, 2014 , http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/pdf/fmfm_1-a.pdf, 4. Lind's project is not a government publication and in no way represents the doctrine of the US Marine Corps or any other actual armed service. Lind wrote this document in the style of a fictitious military doctrinal manual (FMFM stands for "Fleet Marine Force Manual") for a longdefunct state to communicate his ideas on 4GW. Although the anachronistic reference and quasidoctrinal style spoof actual doctrine, the ideas contained within are intended to be taken quite seriously. Lind establishes his authorship and explains his intentions for the document on his blog where the document resides.
war. 12 This resulted in the retention of large, technologically sophisticated military forces emphasizing firepower, protection, and centralized command and control, forces that Lind and Van Creveld saw as inappropriate for waging intrastate warfare against non-state actors dominating "Fourth Generation" or "non-trinitarian" war.
13
As Thomas S. Kuhn argued in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, ignoring a paradigm shift has consequences. Lind applied this reasoning to military affairs, which undergo "dialectical qualitative shifts" comparable to paradigm shifts. Armed forces operating under an outgoing paradigm would become increasingly ineffective as anomalies accumulated. Ultimately, a crisis results and military practitioners adopt a new paradigm that allows them to act in the new environment. 14 Important to Kuhn's theory, a paradigm shift in science has far-reaching effects on the broader world. 4GW theorists embrace this aspect of Kuhn's "paradigm shifts" in their application of his theory to military affairs and politics. The effects of armed forces failing to adopt a "paradigm shift" would extend beyond the battlefield, campaign or even war and collapse the state system, disrupt entire societies, and a return humanity to a Hobbesian war of all against all. 15 Avoiding these unfavorable outcomes requires radically flattening organizational structures, shrinking the size and expense of armed forces to alleviate the financial burden placed on the state, and abandoning the "culture of military order" that prevents low-level initiative and impedes militaries from understanding their similarly unconstrained 4GW opponents. To succeed in a qualitatively different environment, traditionally organized armed forces must adopt the new paradigm and radically reform rather than make smaller, gradual changes within the old paradigm.
16
Fourth Generation warfare thus provided a diagnosis and prescription for recent patterns in warfare. First proposed by a group of military theorists led by William Lind, 4GW rested on three interconnected claims, summarized as follows: first, the nation-state faces a "universal crisis of legitimacy"; second, intrastate war has increased in frequency and intensity in response to state decline; and third, interstate war has become obsolete in the face of nuclear weapons and international norms against "aggressive war." Derived from a generalization presenting warfare as progressing through distinct "generations," William Lind, John Nightengale, John Schmitt, and Thomas Hammes argued the US military held to operational concepts derived from previous, supplanted generational thinking. To succeed in the future, the US armed forces needed to undertake extensive reforms consistent with 4GW theory. 17 4GW offered a systematic and sustained explanation for the emergence of non-state warfare and placed it into the context of declining state capacity.
18
Since its inception in 1989, conceptual elements of 4GW influenced the intellectual environment within the US armed forces. Although no armed service formally incorporated 4GW 16 Lind, "Reshaping the Pentagon for an Age of Austerity." 17 Lind, "The Changing Face of War," 22. 18 Lind, "FMFM 1-A, Fourth Generation War, Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps" 4. theory into its doctrine, the three components of 4GW remain prevalent as a heuristic for understanding contemporary and future war.
19 General Charles Krulak, intellectual father of the "three-block war," testified to Congress, "the days of armed conflict between nation-states are ending." 20 In an article published in 1999, he elaborated by placing the development into historical-political context:
The end of the Cold War heralded not the hoped for era of peace, but rather, a troubling age characterized by global disorder, pervasive crisis, and the constant threat of chaos… In far-flung places like Kenya, Indonesia, and Albania, they have stood face-to-face with the perplexing and hostile challenges of the chaotic post-Cold War world for which the 'rules ' have not yet been written. The three-block war is not simply a fanciful metaphor for future conflicts -it is a reality.
Certain special operations concepts, although not explicitly linked to 4GW writings, also reflect a similar intellectual basis for thinking about war. The emphasis on weak states, disorder, and "small wars" found in special operations doctrine closely parallels the 4GW framework of declining states, small wars, and increasing global disorder. The epigraph in chapter one of JP 3-05, Special Operations, sets the tone:
Today we see a bewildering diversity of separatist wars, ethnic and religious violence, coups d'état, border disputes, civil upheavals, and terrorist attacks, pushing waves of poverty-stricken, war-ridden immigrants (and hordes of drug traffickers as well) across national boundaries. In the increasingly wired global economy, many of these seemingly small conflicts trigger strong secondary effects in surrounding (and even distant) countries. Thus a "many small wars" scenario is compelling military planners in many armies to look afresh at what they call "special operations" or "special forces"-the niche warriors of tomorrow. Both General Krulak and the special operations doctrine writers describe what they see as the conditions in which future war may be waged. Describing this reality is one thing, but explaining it is another. Due to its simplicity, 4GW provided a tool for understanding the complexity of politics and war in an accessible manner, utilizing an essentially inductive logical approach. Once armed with this inductive theory, devotees could interpret experiences (personal or historical) through its lens and fit new events within its framework. In short, it was ready-made for military officers seeking a unifying frame for understanding the world and their experiences.
22
As with all inductive theories, Lind's theory of 4GW requires that all its underlying observations be consistent for the resulting theory to maintain its integrity. No number of confirming observations can confirm the validity of the theory, but a single contradictory example falsifies the theory. If the evidence Lind presents does not support the theory or alternative evidence arises that challenges its base observations, the theory can be set aside. 23 This paper hypothesizes that all three claims underlying Lind's theory will collapse when evaluated with evidence from outside his self-selected "canon." 24 This will show that the nation-state does not face a "universal crisis of legitimacy," intrastate war has not increased in frequency and intensity, Popper, induction presents two problems. First, "generalizing about the properties of a class of objects based on some number of observations of particular instances of that class" is vulnerable to refutation by even a single counter example. Second, "presupposing that a sequence of events in the future will occur as it always has in the past" possess serious risk, especially when applied to human endeavors. 4GW faces both of these problems, since the three observations leading to the theory have exceptions and because it seeks to describe war, the ultimate human endeavor. 24 Lind, "A Canon for the Officer Corps." Lind defends his theory with a self-selected seven book "canon" that he advocates all military officers read. From these books, he asserts military officers will be able to arrive at conclusions similar to his own. The books are intended to be read in an order admittedly selected to persuade the reader of the validity of the 4GW concept. 7 and interstate war remains possible even with nuclear weapons and contemporary international norms against interstate war.
If this monograph disproves any of the three claims comprising the theory, then the reader may conclude the theory makes unsupported inductive leaps that limit its utility for understanding contemporary warfare or forecasting future developments. Although governments and militaries do not make decisions on training, doctrine, or force structure based on purely logical criteria, any finding that demonstrates that 4GW makes unsupported inductive leaps serves as a cautionary tale for military planners.
In his book on future warfare, noted defense scholar Colin Gray provides some sound advice for futurologists and military planners alike as they grapple with forecasting the future. The more serious criticism --and the one this paper reexamines--is whether Van
Creveld and Lind do in fact "get many of the really big things right enough" in their evaluation of past and current patterns in war. 27 If this paper finds that they err seriously on major issues like Through its four sections employing compare and contrast methodology, this paper will
show that the nature of war has not changed, the character of war varies over time but does not inexorably progress through generations, and continuities in warfare will likely continue well into the future. If 4GW does not explain past and contemporary warfare, it cannot serve as a unifying theory of warfare. By disproving the narrative of state decline, the increase in intrastate war and by reinterpreting the "pacific" post-World War II era, this paper undermines the claims that bind together the fundamental logic of 4GW.
Section I: Into the Fourth Generation
To understand 4GW theory, one must first understand the theoretical assumptions and previous work underlying it, including William Lind's "generations of war" and Martin Van
Creveld's concept of "non-trinitarian" war. Fundamentally, and for the purposes of this paper, 4GW constitutes a synthesis of these two concepts, allowing for the close comparison of both. As explained by Echevarria, Clausewitz used the metaphors of "state," "army," and "people" to represent the underlying concepts of "reason," "chance," and "passion" whose interplay constituted the theme of Book One. The "trinity," therefore, described the most important interactions within the phenomenon of war. 41 Reason, chance, and passion respond to each other, sometimes pushing war towards absolutes, but always preventing it from actually reaching its extreme. 42 Each element needs the other, and absent any of the conceptual elements, 38 Echevarria, "Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths," 6-9. According to Lind and Hammes, "first generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors -the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc.-and partially in response to social conditions and ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both the élan of the revolution and the low training levels of conscripted troops." According to Lind, the first generation's "culture of order" remains its most lasting legacy, with rank structure, uniforms, and military etiquette originating in the 17 th century continuing through the present. Third Generation warfare upholds disruption over destruction, speed over mass, and deep operations over direct attacks on fielded forces. Frustrated by the war of attrition on the Western Front during World War One, the German army developed "storm trooper" tactics to break the operational stalemate and collapse their adversaries by penetrating the forward defenses and attacking operational targets in the rear. Variously labeled "blitzkrieg" or "maneuver warfare," the Third Generation "was conceptually complete by 1918" and only awaited its full implementation against Poland, France and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. 48 Enter the Fourth Generation. Unlike his first three generations, Lind does not offer a specific year or event marking the transition from 3GW to 4GW. When Lind and Hammes introduced the theory in 1989, they wrote about it as a future event. 49 In The Sling and the Stone, Hammes modified the theory by arguing 4GW constituted a near parallel development to 3GW, 47 Lind, "The Changing Face of War," 23. emerging "fourth generation" should destroy previous generational remnants. This contrasts with the widespread continuity between generations that Lind so forcefully criticizes when he asserts the US military still resides somewhere between the second and third generations. 55 Since the new idea "negates" the old idea, we should see a dramatic change between generations with little to no overlap. An absence of a clear transition in warfare would therefore constitute evidence that a "dialectically qualitative shift" has not occurred. The ambiguity expressed by Lind and Hammes themselves shows that recent changes in warfare lack this sort of clarity. This seriously undermines the idea of a "generational shift" into 4GW and casts doubt on the validity of a generational model for warfare. Since Hegel's model seeks to describe intellectual rather than material change, its application to warfare runs into the inherent problem of war's dual nature as both a material and immaterial phenomenon. Even sweeping new ideas do not change the face of war in a tidy process. Hammes himself acknowledges this when he explains that "generations" emerge from an evolutionary sans revolutionary process, a point Lind takes strong issue with in an unfavorable critique of Hammes' The Sling and the Stone.
56
Given Lind's understanding of how "generations" progress, an analysis of war and warfare that demonstrates continuity, gradual change or cyclical change would cast doubt on 4GW's utility as a theory of war and warfare. The following sections attempt to do so by comparing and contrasting 4GW claims that the state system, intrastate war and interstate war 55 Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare," 12-13. 64 Lind, "Strategic Defense Initiative." 65 Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare," 14. 66 Lind, "Strategic Defense Initiative." What he does do is cite other theorists, primarily John Boyd: "John Boyd, America's greatest military theorist, defined grand strategy as the art of connecting to as many other independent power centers as possible, while isolating the enemy from as many independent power centers as possible. The grand strategic question facing the U.S. is how to do that in a 21st century that will increasingly be dominated by non-state, Fourth Generation forces." Then, just a few lines later, Lind rhetorically asks, "What does Colonel Boyd's definition of grand strategy mean in such a world?" Lind moves straight to application without making the case for the increased dominance of 4GW forces he just set as the operative condition. Thus, Lind goes directly from theory (his own and Boyd's) to proscriptions without supporting the theory with evidence. These findings are more consistent with observations about international disorder made by Robert Kaplan and Thomas Barnett than with the universalist claims of 4GW advocates. In his "The Coming Global Anarchy," Kaplan describes the weakest states in the international system and outlines their ability to upset international order. The narrative, however, leaves room for success stories and differentiates between states integrated into the democratic, economically vibrant globalized world and states struggling on the periphery. 81 Similarly, Barnett's description of a "non-integrating gap" and a "functional core" allows for significant differences betweenand even directions in-the capacity of states making up the international system. Although neither Kaplan nor Barnett's analysis paints a positive portrait, unlike 4GW thinking, it differentiates between regions, individual states, and even communities within these states.
82
Rather than undergoing any sort of universal decline, trends in state capacity reflect a diverse world of states reacting to a variety of trends that encourage both integration and 82 Thomas Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map," Esquire, March 2003. Barnett argues that a relatively small number of countries located in a band of instability are responsible for almost all global security challenges. He labels these states the "non-integrating gap," characterized by "politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and most important, the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists." 83 Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map."
Since the operative condition of declining state capacity underlying 4GW does not exist as a universal phenomenon and exists within the framework of countervailing positive trends in the developed and much of the developing world, the problems created by low capacity in select states may remain containable and manageable. While the United States armed forces will probably stay engaged along the "seams" of the "non-integrating gap" for the next few decades, it can safely assume risk regarding the worldwide spread of "evolved insurgency" and system-wide state collapse. Policy recommendations that argue for fundamentally transforming armed forces to combat non-state threats err by overstating international conditions favoring intrastate war. The following section examines intrastate war in this contextual light, seeking to determine whether intrastate war has become more frequent or intense since World War Two, providing an additional empirical test of 4GW's underlying logic.
Section III: Trends in Intrastate War
We are entering an era, not of peaceful economic competition between trading blocs, but of warfare between ethnic and religious groups. Even as familiar forms of armed conflict are sinking into the dustbin of the past, radically new ones are raising their heads ready to take their place. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 20 . Note that Van Creveld does not provide a formal definition of terms ("low-intensity conflict") or a quantitative or qualitative operationalization of the term. He does provide a list of LIC's three "principle characteristics," but begins each one with a qualifier ("tend to," "very rarely," and "most.") Right from the start, comparing and contrasting Van Creveld's claims becomes difficult because his definitions, measurements, and empirical evidence are unclear and inexact. This section seeks to clarify his claims so they can be reasonably contrasted with alternative evidence.
85 Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 21. 86 Van Creveld uses innumerable wars to illustrate various points throughout the book, but not to examine the frequency or intensity of intrastate war. Also, his patterns of references to other wars are thematic rather than chronologic, making it difficult to aggregate data into some sort of fair comparison. Fourth generation war is spreading from Libya into West Africa, where states are already largely fictions. Syria is now stateless. The Iraq created by the American invasion was always a Potemkin state, and 4GW there is growing fast, in part fueled from Syria. Fourth generation war is again kicking NATO's and the U.S.'s butt in Afghanistan, and entirely predictable outcome of invading the Graveyard of Empires. Far more dangerously, 4GW elements grow ever stronger in Pakistan, where the state is failing. Even in Egypt, which has been at least a proto-state for 5,000 years, the state is shaky. 88 Lind's anecdotal evidence points out intrastate wars where state weakness plays a major factor and implies the continued proliferation of 4GW conflicts. Even accepting his characterization of these wars, his observations do not demonstrate an overall trend towards more frequent intrastate warfare. He does not establish a baseline level of warfare, acknowledge any concluded wars, nor does he contend with the virtual non-occurrence of intrastate warfare in North America, Europe, East Asia and even large portions of South America and southern Africa. An extensive list of 88 Lind, "4GW is Alive and Well." ongoing intrastate wars, even one containing a considerable number of "new" conflicts, cannot demonstrate a trend.
Arguing for the intensity of contemporary intrastate war, William Lind regularly makes comparisons to the worst excesses of the Thirty Years' War, arguing that post-1945 warfare indicates a return to "wars of mutual annihilation" of the type unseen since before the Peace of Westphalia. 89 In a 2006 article, Lind criticized the Pentagon's strategy in the Global War on
Terrorism by pointing out its annihilative character:
It would be difficult for war objectives to be stated in more maximalist terms. Either they will succeed in turning us into Taliban-style Muslims or we will turn them into happy consumers in globalism's Brave New World. Since most Americans would rather be dead than Talibs and most pious Moslems would rather perish than lose their souls to Brave New World, Mr. Rumsfeld has proclaimed a war of mutual annihilation. That will indeed be another Thirty Years' War, with little chance of a renewed Westphalian order as the outcome. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," 76. Although Fearon and Laitin only count conflicts with over 1,000 battle deaths (the Correlates of War definition for an intrastate war), they use the terms "civil conflict" and "intrastate conflict" rather than "intrastate war" throughout their paper. For clarity, this paper uses the term "intrastate war" throughout. 93 Fearon and Laitin, 76. Creveld stresses the unprecedented range, destructive power and relatively low-cost of nuclear arms. 97 He adds, however, a unique observation when he explains how the process works. Van
Creveld argues that nuclear weapons fundamentally altered the relationship between the state and war by severing the link between victory and survival. "From the beginning of history," he writes, "political organizations going to war against each other could hope to preserve themselves by defeating the enemy and gaining a victory; but now, assuming only that the vanquished side will retain a handful of weapons ready for use, the link between victory and self-preservation has been cut." 98 The basic logic behind the "nuclear hypothesis," therefore, assumes a very limited rationale for why states go to war in the first place: self-preservation. Van Creveld writes, as the "twentieth century was approaching its end major war -at any rate as it applies between states-appeared to be on the retreat. The right to wage it, far from being part and parcel of sovereignty, had been taken away except in cases involving self-defense (and for precisely that reason) they were no longer allowed to benefit by bringing about territorial change.
Thus as such war lost its chief attraction." included all contemporary "great powers," and predated the advent of Van Creveld's "warweariness" and nuclear weapons. In terms of duration, these periods lasted forty-three years, thirty-nine years, and twenty-one years respectively. Van Creveld's "long peace" so far lasted sixty-one years, beginning with the end of the Korean War in 1953.
108 While the current "long peace" has lasted longer than the other similar periods, it has only been marginally longer rather than qualitatively different. This reduces any special significance attributed to the current "long peace" due to its length alone, rather than the level of war within it.
The absence of major war between great powers in the sixty-one years since the end of the Korean War marks a historic occurrence, just not an unprecedented one. As demonstrated above through an analysis of historical patterns of interstate war, multi-decade periods of systemic stability occur regularly, typically following intense episodes of interstate war between major powers. All of these periods occurred before the advent of nuclear weapons and before the development of international norms against "aggressive war" that Martin Van Creveld advances as the casual mechanism for the current "long peace." This casts serious doubts onto the significance and permanence of these two factors in understanding contemporary patterns in interstate war.
As Wallensteen concludes, "it is too early to claim a universal ending to major war. In fact, there have been long periods without major war. It has been noted that the triangle of Austria-Germany-Russia saw 150 consecutive years without war ." 109 Although longlasting, these periods tend to end abruptly and transition into periods of intense interstate war. 
Conclusion
In his book on future war, Colin Gray lays out both the necessity and challenge of thinking about the future. While predicting the future remains an impossible endeavor, the longtime horizons associated with research and development, acquisitions, and training and fielding modern militaries makes some vision of at least the near future vital to defense planning. Thus, those who attempt to forecast the future must beware overreaching and unnecessarily detailed predictions and instead focus on "getting the really big things right enough." This paper laid out 4GW's claims about three of those "really big things" in effort to determine the theory's utility for thinking about the future of war. 110 When so examined, all three observations underlying Fourth Generation warfare failed to stand up. As a result, their projection of these trends into the future lacks validity and their recommendations for radical force restructuring to combat only non-state threats remains unsupported.
The overarching political context for the "four generations of war," the rise and ultimate decline of the Westphalian state system, constitutes the first chink in 4GW's armor.
Given their theory as laid out in Section I, state capacity should be on the decline across the entire international system, but as demonstrated in Section II, state capacity has not universally declined since 1945. While endemic weakness remains in the least developed states, this represents incomplete state formation rather than a decline driven by revolutionary developments in warfare.
Since states look likely to remain strong and at the core of the international system, their traditional source of power, national armed forces, will remain important tools for combating both intrastate and interstate violence.
110 Gray, Another Bloody Century, 45. 36 Also contrary to 4GW claims, intrastate warfare has not increased in frequency or intensity since 1945. Rather than following a unbroken, upward trend, intrastate wars accumulated during the early Cold War, reached a stable level during the 1970s and 1980s, and then fell off in the 1990s. As such, the evidence does not support the 4GW narrative of a fundamental change in the nature of war. Given the lack of a powerful upward trend towards increasing intrastate war, their forecast for ever increasing intrastate warfare becomes hard to accept. Although intrastate war causes widespread death and destruction in the "non-integrating gap," post-1945 patterns of intrastate warfare do not represent a tidal wave of change destined to spread to the "core states" of the developed world. Given that intrastate war will likely remain a phenomenon of the "non-integrating gap," developed nations should continue to plan for expeditionary conflicts against non-state threats rather than for the domestic unrest and nonterritorial, "non-trinitarian" warfare described by Van Creveld and Lind. Along with their erroneous conclusions about intrastate war, 4GW claims about the waning of interstate war after 1953 underlie their prescriptions for radical defense reform. Since their theory places interstate warfare on a path towards rapid and irreversible obsolescence, they see risk little risk in dismantling conventional armed forces in favor of forces designed exclusively for combat against non-state actors. In effect, 4GW advocates ask the reader to "trust them" based on a limited analysis of one sixty-one year period. As demonstrated in Section IV, the "long peace" following the Korean War does not constitute the first "long peace" between major powers. Other pacific periods in the international system have lasted decades only to end abruptly and unexpectedly. Since 4GW theorists do not address the earlier periods or what caused them to end, the 4GW theory can tell little about what factors might cause the current "long peace" to end. Instead, they project the current lack of major interstate war into the future without considering the risk that it might end. Again, 4GW advocates ask us to "trust them" without providing the broader framework necessary to evaluate their claims about the future of war.
Colin S. Gray again provides insight into the difficult business of forecasting the future, writing that "the pressing challenge is for us to anticipate the future as best we are able in ways that reduce, hopefully minimize, the risk of our committing errors in prediction that are likely to have catastrophic consequences. The necessary skill is to pursue a strategy of minimum What if they are wrong? Since their being wrong would mean a continuation of longterm historic patterns in statecraft and warfare, the range of likely outcomes narrows. First, the continuance of the state system would make an eventual reoccurrence of interstate rivalry, including interstate warfare, likely. Second, a continued state system will limit the expansion of intrastate war to somewhere within the historic range. A government that misinterpreted these patterns in statecraft and warfare and restructured its armed forces for only intrastate warfare, even large-scale intrastate warfare, would likely find itself unprepared for the reemergence of traditional interstate war. Given that past pacific periods ended abruptly, the state would probably not possess the time needed to raise, train, and equip large air, sea, and land forces organized to combat similarly organized forces. The results of such an error would be catastrophic for the nation making it and for any other nation dependent on it for extended security.
Given the future's inherent uncertainty, "defense establishments know that they cannot help but make many mistakes in their planning, but they can aspire to make mainly small, rather than large, errors." 115 Fourth Generation war does not provide a framework for minimizing the risk of committing errors in prediction, since it bases its predictions on a faulty theoretical framework and on empirical claims that do not stand up to rigorous analysis. It awaits another scholar or group of scholars to unify social science research with historical argumentation that is 114 J.D. Miller, "Norman Angell and Rationality in International Relations," in Thinkers of the Twenty Years ' Crisis, ed. David Long and Peter Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) , 105-110. Early in the twentieth century, the British politician, journalist, and theorist Norman Angell theorized that increased economic integration, international organization, and the requirement for the support of the local population to extract anything worthwhile from conquest had already rendered war obsolete. Importantly, even Angell did not predict that war would end, only that it rationally should end due to its inefficiency. 
